The vast majority of these triumphs, though, have all come in conventional pitched battle between the Israel Defense Force and neighboring states. A tradition of failed attempts at overwhelming unconventional militancy and unrest with raw military force also exists, dating back no later than Israel's unsuccessful attempt to annihilate Fatah and the PLO in Jordan in 1967. Israel again failed to destroy the PLO in the 1980's in Lebanon, and failed to stamp out West Bank suicide bombers in Operation Defensive Shield in 2002. The PLO eventually faded out of existence in its traditional form after the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004. Attempts to strong arm Hamas, such as the 2004 assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and the ongoing Israeli blockade of the Gaza strip have done little to act as a deterrent and have given the Arab world a platform for which to position Israel the aggressor. Israeli restrictions on freedom of movement in the West Bank have successfully cut down on terrorist attacks against Israeli targets, but those restrictions also serve as much of the basis for enduring regional strife.
Most recently and perhaps most importantly, Israel categorically failed in its stated goals to eliminate Hezbollah and prevent rockets fired in Southern Lebanon from falling into Northern Israel in the summer of 2006. Indeed, Hezbollah maintained its rocket capability throughout war, and it still exists today. It gained regional influence among Israel's adversaries for successfully withstanding an Israeli assault and successfully penetrating Israeli defenses. It established itself as even more of a juggernaut in Lebanese politics and as an armed force. Most estimates concluded that the lion's share of casualties due to IDF bombing were Lebanese civilians, further giving Hezbollah access to international sympathy it otherwise would not have had, and further vilifying an Israeli military already under criticism for overreacting and failing to respect international humanitarian law. The folly of IDF action in Lebanon proved so pervasive that the Israeli government nearly collapsed under pressure from a public deeply entrenched in military matters and livid at the lack of preparation with which its sons, daughters, and indeed older generations were sent to war.
It is with this stigma that the Israeli military now continues an operation in the Gaza Strip that bears a strong strategic and tactical resemblance to the 2006 war. They have both been pitched as total wars aimed at nothing less than the complete elimination of militant or terrorist capabilities. They both mark extensive escalations by Israel that broadly affect Lebanese or Palestinian civilian populations. They are both premier examples of the seemingly timeless problems with attempting to defeat unconventional combat tactics and undermine militant ideologies with a traditional army and air force. 2006 seemed to shatter much of the IDF's aura of invincibility and do-no-wrong tactical approach. This war faces the same risks.
Entebbe was a masterstroke of intelligence-gathering, planning, governmental facilitation, and special forces execution. It defined Israel's response to foreign aggression and terrorism for decades as ferociously efficient, fine-tuned, and narrowly-focused. Recent offensives have begun to redefine it as erratic and destructive.
No comments:
Post a Comment